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Keeping steady as she goes:  A negotiated order perspective on technological evolution 
 
Abstract 
 
A central idea in the theory of technology cycles is that social and political mechanisms are most 
important during the selection of a dominant design, and that eras of incremental change are 
socially uninteresting periods in which innovation is driven by technological momentum and 
elaboration of the dominant design. In this essay, we overturn the ontological assumption that 
social order is inherently stable, drawing on Anselm Strauss’ concept of negotiated order to 
analyze the persistence of a dominant design as a social accomplishment: an outcome of ongoing 
processes that reinforce or challenge a socially negotiated order. Thus, we shift focus from 
battles over standards to periods of normal innovation.  We extend the technology cycles model 
to explain social dynamics in periods of incremental change, and to make predictions specifying 
how contextual conditions in standards setting organizations affect social interaction, leading to 
reinforcement or challenge to a socio-technical order.  
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Introduction 
 
Understanding the nature and sources of technological change has been a central concern 
for technology management scholars and organization theorists, as well as social scientists more 
generally. One of the prevailing theories of technological change is the technology cycles model 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  In this theory, the pattern of evolution follows a model of 
punctuated equilibrium (Kuhn, 1962/1970), where relatively quiet periods of incremental change 
and social equilibrium are disrupted by technological discontinuities, i.e. rare and unpredictable 
innovations in product or process design (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 
1992).  These discontinuities are generally thought to be exogenous shocks – emerging from 
outside of a technological community – that mark the beginning of an era of ferment, where 
technological alternatives vie for dominance, until the selection of a dominant design ushers in 
an era of orderly incremental change and starts the cycle again (see Figure 1).  
Theory on technology cycles accounts not only for the pattern of technological progress, 
but also how a technological community, i.e. the organizations and individuals concerned with 
the ongoing development and production of a technology, co-evolves with a technology. 1  
Moving beyond technological determinism that assumes that innovation is solely determined by 
features of the technology itself, technology cycles theory emphasizes that the path of 
technological evolution is also socially determined through the interactions between the 
organizational and individual actors that make up a technological community, with eras of 
ferment showing high levels of social and technical contestation and eras of incremental change 
having relatively little social interaction (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). The basic cyclical 
model of technology evolution has been applied to a wide variety of cases (e.g. Anderson & 
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Tushman, 1990; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; Rothaermel & 
Hill, 2005; Tripsas, 1997), but the increasing complexity of technological systems has 
necessitated refinement and expansion of the model (see Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Murmann & 
Frenken, 2006; Suarez, 2004).  At the same time, emerging empirical evidence highlights 
unresolved gaps in the technology cycles model.  Recent studies suggest that eras of incremental 
change remain highly interactive and even disputatious for members of a technological 
community (e.g. Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010; Jakobs, Procter, & Williams, 2001; Leiponen, 
2008; Simcoe, 2007; Spring et al., 1995).  Moreover, formal standards setting organizations, 
alliance networks, and industry consortia provide venues for ongoing debate and negotiation 
long after a dominant design is selected, signifying more substantial social interaction than 
would be predicted by the technology cycles model. Research about these organizations as 
interaction contexts has been limited, instead focusing on alliances and consortia as vehicles of 
competitive advantage or formal standards setting as an alternative to market-based 
standardization, which leaves our knowledge of the social dynamics of standardization within 
these contexts underdeveloped.    
In this essay, we explore ongoing interaction and social dynamics in periods of 
incremental change by applying a negotiated order perspective to the theory of technology 
cycles.  In adopting a punctuated equilibrium model, technology cycles theory rests on the 
underlying ontological assumption that social order is inherently stable. This assumption of 
baseline stability in the social order, common across much social sciences research (Tsoukas & 
Chia, 2002), challenges two key features of technology cycles research. First, prior research 
depicts the era of incremental change as theoretically and socially uninteresting. Given an innate 
stability in social order, the period of incremental change is depicted as smooth, orderly, and 
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driven by technological considerations. Second, prior research identifies exogenous shocks as the 
primary locus of punctuated change. With an underlying assumption of stability, an exogenous 
shock is needed to destabilize the inertia that sets in after the establishment of a dominant design, 
and begin the next cycle of technological evolution (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). 
Negotiated order theory rejects the idea that social orders are innately stable, proposing 
instead that order and stability are social accomplishments that need to be explained (Maines, 
1978, 1982; Strauss, 1978; Strauss, Schatzman, Bucher, Erhrlich, & Sabshin, 1963). Consistent 
with its roots in symbolic interactionism, the central premise of negotiated order theory is that 
social order is created through social interaction. Social structure or order, in this view, emerges 
through interactions and negotiations among actors who inhabit and create a social context. In 
emphasizing the importance of social interaction as a basis for social order, negotiated order 
theory differs markedly from theoretical perspectives that assume stability or inertia of social 
systems. Any disturbance to the context, such as a staff change, a change in alliances, or 
advances in technology or practices, triggers renegotiation or reappraisal that can lead to the 
creation of a new social order. In emphasizing that order is constantly being reinforced or 
challenged though social interactions, negotiated order theory holds that stability or “no change,” 
like change, “must be worked at” within any social system (Strauss, et al., 1963: 167). For 
technological change, social orders can be understood as socio-technical orders, where 
technological evolution is co-determined by social interaction and technical factors that jointly 
construct the social structure (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992).    
In applying negotiated order theory, we use a baseline assumption of instability, where 
social orders need reinforcement to persist. This assumption of instability has two implications 
for technology cycles research. First, it suggests that periods of stable, incremental change, far 
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from being uninteresting and driven by technological considerations alone, are themselves a 
product of social processes or social interactions that are poorly understood.  The attention of the 
technology cycles literature has been almost exclusively focused on the era of ferment and 
battles to determine a dominant design (e.g. Suarez, 2004; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 
2001).  Second, it creates a mechanism for endogenously derived change that can account for 
technological discontinuities emerging from within a technological community.  In the process 
of contestation and negotiation around details of incremental changes to standards, members of a 
technological community may have occasion to challenge the socio-technical order, and these 
challenges may initiate changes to the order.  Thus, more enduring or more radical changes to 
order can emerge from social interaction within a technological community, rather than having to 
come from outside. 
Negotiated order theory is well-suited to examining social dynamics in technological 
communities because of its attention to context and its focus on social interaction.  Technological 
communities are complex contexts, involving firms, individuals, regulatory agencies, and 
technological components.  Theory that explains stability and change in technological 
communities should both recognize different types of actors and be able to specify which 
contextual properties affect social interaction that will feed back stability or change to the socio-
technical order.  Negotiated order theory accounts for the complexity of context, emphasizing 
that some aspects of a structural context or social order may be more important than others in 
influencing social interactions and their outcomes. Other social theory perspectives consider a 
recursive relationship between action and structure (e.g. Orlikowski, 1992; Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002); however, negotiated order theory is unique in accounting for different categories of actors 
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and in challenging researchers to identify and analytically relate proximate aspects of a context 
to social interactions and their outcomes.   
Therefore, negotiated order theory offers a conceptual framework that allows us to 
identify contextual conditions specific to technological communities. The challenge for 
researchers analyzing a specific context like technological communities is to identify which 
conditions specific to that context will influence social interactions and interaction outcomes and 
to explain how. Our objective in this paper, then, is to extend the technology cycles model to 
specify the contextual conditions where interaction can lead to actions to challenge or reinforce a 
socio-technical order in periods of incremental change. To do so, we apply negotiated order 
concepts to standards setting organizations (SSOs).  SSOs are a fruitful setting to explore 
questions of technological change and social order, because they are a primary context of 
ongoing interaction for technological communities throughout technology cycles.   
We develop the remainder of this paper in four sections. In the following section, we 
describe the technology cycles model and the role of SSOs in technological innovation. Next, we 
provide a brief overview of negotiated order theory, and use it to develop a model of stability and 
change in a socio-technical order. We identify contextual conditions of the SSO context that we 
expect to be important in shaping social interactions and their outcomes. Next, we develop causal 
arguments and testable propositions explaining how specific forms of these contextual conditions 
will influence actors’ propensities to reinforce or challenge a socio-technical order.  We conclude 
by discussing the implications of our research for the technology cycles model, as well as 
broader implications for practice and for other organizational research. 
 
Technology Cycles Theory, Technical Standards and Standards Setting Organizations 
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Figure 1 shows an illustration of technology cycles theory. The theory is based on an 
evolutionary model of variation, selection, and retention.  Exogenously introduced technological 
discontinuities produce variation, leading to the contestation of alternatives during an era of 
ferment that culminates in the selection of a dominant design.  Established through social and 
political processes within technological communities, the dominant design serves as an 
organizing logic—involving both cognitive frames and material design specifications—that 
guides smooth, technologically-driven progress in the subsequent period of incremental change, 
where technological momentum results in incremental improvements that elaborate on the 
dominant design.   
****************Figure 1 about here****************** 
 
For complex technologies, a dominant design is a prevailing overarching technological 
architecture for a product class.  Complex technologies are those where product subsystems 
provided by multiple firms are linked together through interfaces (Rycroft & Kash, 1994; 
Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992).  A dominant design is a high level architecture consisting of 
relatively stable core components and interfaces (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Murmann & 
Frenken, 2006), allowing for the subsystems and components developed by multiple firms to 
work together. The selection of a dominant design signifies the establishment of a socio-
technical order, which can be understood as the integration of a social order and a dominant 
design, as it represents high-level agreement about which technological alternative will be the 
focus of investment in feature improvement and complementary products (Tushman & 
Rosenkopf, 1992).  The reduction in uncertainty allows for industry boundaries to be drawn or 
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re-drawn, i.e., for the identification of the industry participants who will compete in the 
marketplace and act together to incrementally innovate.   
While the selection of a dominant design marks the end of punctuated change, the period 
of incremental change that follows involves ongoing technological change that requires 
coordination. In incremental change, both subsystems and interfaces often must be adjusted to 
accommodate changes.  Though the architecture of the system can be stable, the ‘devil is in the 
details’ that must be continually coordinated for the subsystems to work together in practice as 
the technology advances.   
This coordination is often done through technical standards, which are codified 
specifications about the components of a technology and the interfaces between them (Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1993).  Technical standardization can occur with varying levels of formality. 
Several classifications of standards have been proposed, such as de facto (set by markets) versus 
de jure (set by committees) (Farrell & Saloner, 1988), and open versus closed (O'Mahony & 
West, 2005).  For our purposes, we consider formalized, de jure technical standards that 
represent coordination in a technological community.  Dominant designs and technical standards 
are independent, in the sense that technical standards may be agreed upon and codified for 
technologies that are not dominant designs, e.g. there were formal technical standards written for 
HD DVD technology2, though it was never a dominant design. Similarly, dominant designs, 
particularly for simple technologies, e.g. a bicycle with two wheels of the same size (Bijker & 
Pinch, 1984), do not necessarily have formal technical standards.   
For complex technologies, standardization is necessary to enable market acceptance and 
market growth (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001), and dominant 
designs and technical standards are intimately linked and complementary.  In addition, formal 
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standardization tends to be especially important for dominant designs, because they tend to have 
wider diffusion and bigger technological communities (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978).  To 
enable coordinated incremental change via formal standards, industry participants can participate 
in standards setting organizations (SSOs), where interaction can occur apart from a competitive 
market setting.  SSOs are voluntary organizations that provide a context for a technological 
community to interact to develop consensus technical standards for an industry. SSOs meet 
regularly, and have rules and procedures that govern the consensus-making process. Membership 
is typically at the firm level3, but firms are represented by individuals.  Because they are 
responsible for working out the technical details of standards, most individuals involved in SSOs 
are engineers.  While standards can also be defined through private alliances or market 
competition, most formal standards are created in SSOs (Shapiro & Varian, 1999), making SSOs 
the principal arena in which socio-technical orders are negotiated.   
The discussions held in SSOs and the resulting standards advance technologies through 
the era of incremental change4, yet progress is not necessarily smooth or orderly.  In practice, 
activity in SSOs can be highly contentious, leading to delays in publishing standards (Jakobs, 
2002; Simcoe, 2007), and causing some participants to call for reform in standards setting 
processes (Cargill & Bolin, 2007).  Moreover, the interaction in SSOs is frequently face-to-face, 
with considerable cost in engineers’ time and travel to participating firms (Rosenkopf, Metiu, & 
George, 2001).  Expenditure on SSO participation over long periods of time indicates that 
ongoing highly technical interaction with other firms in the technological community is valuable 
even in an era of incremental change.  Therefore, instead of the decreased level and importance 
of social activity that existing theory predicts, firms actively engage with each other and the 
technology and continue to interact even in eras of incremental change.   
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In summary, SSOs are a context and vehicle for working out the detailed ways in which a 
slightly improved version of one component will work with a slightly improved version of 
another, or how complementary products will work with an incremental improvement.  
Technical standards are the output of SSOs that codify the outcomes of past negotiations, 
forming the basis for the next negotiations.  Orderly progression along a path for incremental 
improvement requires this sort of detailed working out and continual reconstitution of order.   
 
Negotiated Order in Technological Communities 
A Model of Negotiated Social Order 
Negotiated order theory develops a model of social order that is maintained through a 
recursive relationship between a structural context, a more proximate negotiation context, social 
interactions, and interaction outcomes. The structural context is the broader institutional context 
“within which... negotiations take place in the largest sense” (Strauss, 1978: 98). It includes the 
history, legal and regulatory environment, major ideological debates, culture, and authority 
relations in an industry or field.  
The structural context is the backdrop of the negotiation context – the subset of salient 
properties of the broader structural context that have a proximate influence on social interactions 
and their outcomes. The negotiated order perspective emphasizes that most elements of the 
structural context are only remotely related to any specific social interaction, in contrast with 
other social theories, such as structuration theory, which posit a direct relationship between 
structure and individual action. As the salient venue in which technological change is negotiated, 
the SSO is the negotiation context in technological communities during periods of incremental 
change.  
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Contextual conditions are the elements of the negotiation context that are most important 
in influencing social interactions and interaction outcomes within a specific negotiation context. 
Strauss (1978) defines contextual conditions proximate contextual properties that are salient in a 
social interaction.  In specific case studies using the negotiated order perspective, he identified 
contextual conditions that serve three distinct purposes. First, contextual conditions define the 
types of actors that are interacting within a negotiation context, and the agency relationships 
between them. Second, contextual conditions can have causal effects on social interactions and 
their outcomes. Third, contextual conditions can mediate the causal effect of some other 
contextual condition on interaction outcomes.  The contextual conditions of a given negotiation 
context can serve any or all of these purposes. 
Contextual conditions that have causal or mediating effects influence social 
interactions—proposing agreements, making trade-offs, forming coalitions, identifying and 
framing issues, contesting proposals, etc.—leading to interaction outcomes, which are actions 
that either reinforce or challenge the exiting order. Interaction outcomes feed back into the 
context. Actions that reinforce a social order lead to stability, which involves incremental change 
in both the negotiation and structural contexts. Actions that challenge a social order cause 
discontinuous change in the structural context, when they alter more formal permanent structures 
(Strauss, et al., 1963: 165).  
Given the focus on the proximate negotiation context, negotiated order theory offers a 
general framework that researchers can draw on to formulate specific social mechanisms linking 
specific contextual conditions, social interaction, and actions to challenge or reinforce a social 
order. Social mechanisms are causal accounts of how one event or variable is linked with another 
event or variable, i.e. “social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of 
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the social structure” (Merton, 1968: 43-44). The elaboration of social mechanisms is a means of 
developing middle-range theory – theory that is more bounded than general social laws that 
apply across time and context, but more generalizable than a descriptive account of the 
relationship between events or variables in a specific case (Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1996; 
Merton, 1968). In developing propositions, we identify specific social mechanisms that explain 
how contextual conditions of the negotiation context of SSOs affect interaction outcomes in 
technological communities. In some cases, the mechanisms that we identify specify a chain of 
interaction outcomes produced through ongoing interaction, in which one contextual condition 
has a causal effect on mediating contextual conditions, which in turn influences actions that 
either challenge or reinforce the social order.  
 
Application of the Negotiated Order Model to Technological Communities 
Figure 2 represents the relationship between the structural context, negotiation context, 
and social interactions and outcomes in technological communities. The central feature of the 
structural context in technological communities is the dominant design defining a high level 
architecture for a product class. In addition to the dominant design, the structural context 
includes the market structure of firms with varying resources, market shares, and capabilities, the 
legal context including patenting laws and anti-trust regulation, engineering professions and their 
norms or logics, academic institutions that produce basic science and engineering research, 
collaborate with firms, and train employees who work in the industry, major purchasers and 
suppliers, and other organizations or actors that play a role in the field. This broader context is 
linked to social interactions via the negotiation context, a demarcated area of the structural 
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context whose contextual conditions have a proximate influence on the interactions and their 
outcomes.  
****************Figure 2 about here****************** 
 
The SSO is the negotiation context within which technologies are regulated in periods of 
incremental change. As highlighted earlier, Strauss identified three purposes of contextual 
conditions:  defining the type of actor and agency relations between them, identifying conditions 
that can have causal effects on interactions and their outcomes, and identifying conditions that 
mediate the effects of other contextual conditions.  
First, Strauss (1978: 99) emphasizes that the types of actors (e.g. individuals, collectives, 
political parties, nation-states, etc.) interacting within a negotiation context, and the agency 
relationships between them are central to shaping social interactions and their outcomes. In the 
SSO context, individuals and firms are the primary types of actors, with individuals acting as 
firm agents.  However, individuals may also represent other entities, such as professions or 
ideologies or governments or even themselves, simultaneously or in turn (Strauss, 1978: 125). 
Within the SSO context, individuals are typically both firm employees and engineers, i.e. they 
are agents of their professions as well as their employers.  Whether individuals are representing 
themselves, their firms, or their profession, or all of these at once, is important in influencing the 
outcome of a social interaction. 
In addition to the types of actors and the agency relationships between them, Strauss 
identifies additional conditions of the negotiation context that can have a causal impact on social 
interactions between actors. We identify three such causal contextual conditions that are 
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important in SSOs: (1) formal rules and procedures, (2) networks of relationships between firms 
or individuals, and (3) professional norms.  
Formal rules and procedures are an important contextual condition that influences the 
power distribution in a negotiation context. While rules and procedures are one of multiple bases 
of power (Strauss, 1978:119), they are particularly relevant in SSOs. These rules and procedures 
have a causal effect on social interactions and their outcomes by defining decision-making 
procedures and voting thresholds. 
The network of relationships between actors can represent the experience or history of 
prior interactions among negotiation parties, as well as the structure of relationships within a 
negotiation context, including “cliques and friendships of varying duration and strength” 
(Strauss, 1978: 126). In SSOs, the overall structure or pattern of relationships among firm or 
individual actors is important in structuring communication, influence, and conflict among all 
actors in the SSO. Actors’ positions within a network of relationships influence their interactions 
with others and their propensity to engage in actions that reinforce or challenge the existing 
socio-technical order.  
Professional norms and values in engineering are also an important contextual condition 
in SSOs because of their effects on legitimacy concerns among negotiating actors. Legitimacy 
concerns as defined by the professions in a negotiation context involve the definition of actions 
or outcomes as normatively acceptable within a negotiation context (Strauss, 1978). Professional 
norms in engineering emphasize a commitment to technologies and to support technologically 
superior outcomes, independent of the political or financial interests of individuals or firms. 
Strauss (1978) also identified, through his use of case studies, contextual conditions that 
mediate the effects of other contextual conditions on interaction outcomes. An important one for 
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the SSO context is the stakes, i.e. the interests or goals of diverse negotiating parties. In the SSO 
context, the stakes of negotiating actors can mediate effects of rules and procedures, the network 
of relationships, and professional norms. In contexts where different parties are negotiating a 
cooperative structure, different parties in a negotiation may have a common stake in cooperating. 
In addition, they will have their own unique stakes that they aim to achieve (Strauss, 1978: 160). 
For actors involved in technological evolution, an SSO exists because of the common stakes 
within a technological community. Though firms may seek distinctive competitive advantage 
vis-à-vis each other, their interactions are conditioned by their common purpose in besting 
competing technologies. If community members are unable to reach consensus on specific 
operational details of the technology, resulting interoperability problems and market confusion 
can lead to failure in the marketplace (Farrell & Saloner, 1988).   
The contextual conditions shape interaction through specific social mechanisms and 
result in interaction outcomes.  In the SSO context, these mechanisms are specific to particular 
causal antecedents.  For example, social network mechanisms like shared beliefs and knowledge 
or access to diverse information are specific to particular social network positions, but are not 
contextual conditions.  
Finally, interaction outcomes can feed directly back on the negotiation context. For 
example, ongoing interactions between individuals in the SSO context leads to constant 
evolution and change in the network of relationships between individuals, whether or not there is 
radical change in the larger socio-technical order. Interaction outcomes also feed back to the 
larger structural context. Actions that reinforce the socio-technical order lead to relative stability, 
e.g. incremental changes that are on a technology’s established migration path. Actions that 
challenge the socio-technical order can disrupt an existing dominant design, ushering in a new 
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era of technological ferment. Changes in both the structural and negotiation contexts, in turn, 
impact subsequent social interactions.  
 
Predicting Actions that Reinforce or Challenge the Socio-Technical Order 
In the following section, we extend our application of negotiated order theory to SSOs, 
specifying mechanisms by which rules and procedures of SSOs, networks of relationships, and 
professional norms will influence whether the outcome of social interaction will be actions to 
reinforce or challenge the existing socio-technical order.  We identify specific mechanisms 
related to setup and governance of the SSO itself, then features related to firm and individual 
actors. Mechanisms relating to the set-up and governance of SSOs emphasize the rules and 
procedures of SSOs as formal organizations, as well as the overall network of relationships in an 
SSO. Because firms and individuals are different types of actors, we distinguish between 
mechanisms relating to social network interactions between firms, and mechanisms relating to 
social network interactions between individuals.  
 
Setup and Governance of the SSO Negotiation Context 
The primary objective of an SSO is consensus around standards (Jakobs, et al., 2001).  To 
reach agreement, SSOs rely on rules and procedures—formal procedure and due process for 
proposing new standards or changes to existing standards, and ensuring the fair participation of 
its member firms when deciding which standards to adopt.  Strauss (1978) emphasizes that rules 
and procedures affect the distribution of power between actors, which makes them an important 
influence on social interactions and interaction outcomes. Though firms in the broader 
marketplace have power based on size or proprietary resources, rules and procedures can affect 
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the power distribution within the delimited SSO context. For example, for an SSO to be 
accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), it must ensure that any firm 
with direct and material interest has a right to participate by:  a) expressing a position and its 
basis, b) having that position considered, and c) having the right to appeal.5   
Adhering to formal procedures can be a way to support challenge to a negotiated order.  
Formal procedures and due process provide channels for firms to raise challenges that can be 
heard and considered in a way that might not be possible otherwise.  While consideration of a 
standard is no guarantee of its acceptance, rules and procedures prevent summary dismissal of 
challenges. One notable example of this sort of challenge is the adoption of a CDMA standard 
for wireless telecommunications in the U.S.  Qualcomm, the primary patent-holder for CDMA 
technology was a small startup when CDMA technology was approved as a digital standard in 
1993 by the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA), the primary U.S. SSO for 
telecommunications (Farley, 2005).  The approval of this standard upset the existing TDMA 
standard that was supported by industry leaders like AT&T and Ericsson, and upset the socio-
technical order by facilitating Qualcomm’s rapid growth into a multi-billion dollar firm (Mock, 
2005).  Despite the resistance of much more powerful industry leaders, the formal procedures of 
the TIA ensured that Qualcomm was able to have CDMA technology considered. 
 
Proposition 1: Rules and procedures in SSOs that support equal rights of participants to present 
alternatives, voice positions or appeal decisions will increase the likelihood of challenge actions. 
 
While creating channels for firms to raise challenges to a socio-technical order, rules and 
procedures can also set a minimum threshold of support needed to bring about change.  When 
this threshold is high (e.g. requiring consensus of committee members for adoption of new 
standards), it can have the effect of tilting the power distribution toward the coalitions and 
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groups that favor preserving the status quo, promoting actions or technological developments 
that reinforce the existing order. 
 
Proposition 2: Rules and procedures in SSOs that set a high minimum threshold of support for 
changes to standards will increase the likelihood of reinforcement actions. 
 
The network of relationships is another contextual condition of SSOs that provides a set 
of mechanisms that affect whether a negotiated order is reinforced or challenged.  As highlighted 
earlier, Strauss identifies social relationships between actors, including the pattern of 
relationships in an organization and the presence of cliques as important features of the 
negotiation context that will influence social interactions (Strauss, 1978: 124). Subsequent 
research has greatly expanded our knowledge of the role of social networks and, more 
specifically, of network structures in influencing the flow of information, innovation, and other 
social outcomes (e.g. Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Burt, 1992). A social network structure is the 
pattern of relationships in a population of firms, individuals or other social actors. Among other 
things, a social network’s structure can affect patterns of communication and the formation of 
common or divergent knowledge and perspectives, which can create common or divergent stakes 
among actors.  
Two topographical features of social networks that we expect to affect negotiations in 
SSOs are social network density and the cohesiveness of subgroups. Dense structures involve 
multiple, redundant connections across many or most firms or individuals in a population. Clique 
or “small world” structures (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) are characterized by subgroups that are 
densely connected within the subgroup, but infrequently or weakly connected to each other. In 
the context of SSOs, the network structure within the SSO is an important feature of the 
negotiation context that can influence interaction outcomes.   
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 We propose that a dense network structure will support reinforcement actions.  Densely 
connected social networks with a multiplicity of ties between parties foster shared knowledge 
and beliefs (Coleman, 1988). In the context of SSOs, dense networks lead to shared beliefs, 
grounded in common knowledge and information, about how technologies can and should 
evolve. Shared knowledge and beliefs ground social interactions about the course of 
technological evolution in an industry, delimiting what is feasible as defined by the existing 
dominant design. They also create a common stake among actors, who define their interests and 
goals based on their shared beliefs about which technological choices are superior. These shared 
beliefs about what is feasible, rooted in the dominant design, as well as common stakes in current 
technologies make it less likely that firms or individuals would pursue changes that challenge the 
existing socio-technical order.   
 
Proposition 3:  A dense network of relationships within an SSO will create common stakes, 
increasing the likelihood of reinforcement actions.  
 
By contrast, a clique network structure of relationships will promote challenge actions. 
Because clique structures have densely connected subgroups that are only weakly connected to 
other subgroups, in clique structures, communication and prevalence of shared knowledge and 
beliefs tend to be intense within the subgroups, but more sporadic or less common across 
subgroups.  An SSO with primarily non-overlapping membership across its subcommittees or 
working groups would have a clique structure, i.e. if different components of a technology were 
produced by different vendors with only a few vendors working across components.   
SSOs that have an overall clique structure should be more prone to challenges to the 
socio-technical order for two reasons. First, quasi-independent subgroups have fewer 
relationships that connect actors in different groups, and are less likely to have redundant 
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knowledge, increasing the amount and diversity of knowledge in the SSO context as a whole that 
can be recombined for innovation (von Hippel, 1988). As a result, interfirm social networks with 
clique structures have been associated with innovation for the network as a whole (Fleming, 
King, & Juda, 2007; Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  Diversity of knowledge held by subgroups in an 
SSO, by fostering innovation, makes it more likely that more alternatives or more radical 
alternatives to the current socio-technical order will be presented to the group for consideration 
and negotiation. The introduction of more or more radical proposals into negotiations is likely to 
lead to challenges to the socio-technical order.  Second, to the extent that subgroups have 
discussions that are independent from the discussions held within other cliques, they should be 
more likely to develop divergent stakes, and develop proposals that conflict, resulting in 
continual negotiation and challenges to the socio-technical order. 
 
Proposition 4:  A network of relationships with a clique pattern within an SSO will create 
divergent stakes, increasing the likelihood of challenge actions. 
 
Firm Actors and the Negotiation of Social Order in the SSO Context 
Firms are important actors in technological evolution, and one of the two central types of 
actors in the SSO context. The network of relationships among firms is a critical contextual 
condition in SSOs that has a causal impact on interaction outcomes. Firms that choose to 
participate in formal standards setting engage in ongoing, direct interaction with other firms in a 
technological community (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010).  This interaction, and the specific 
patterns of relationships that develop between a focal firm and other firms in a technological 
community, i.e. a firm’s social network position, can influence whether a focal firm acts to 
challenge or reinforce the socio-technical order.   
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An advantageous social network position causes a firm to develop its own unique stake in 
reinforcing the existing socio-technical order, which allows it to reap benefits that are not 
available to firms with less advantageous network positions.  We consider two types of 
advantageous position that are commonly studied in social network research: centrality and 
bridging structural holes.  Central firms, i.e. firms that are well-connected to others in an SSO, 
develop a stake in the existing socio-technical order for two reasons. First, central firms benefit 
from their position by having greater access to information and having greater prominence, 
enhancing their ability to advance their own interests in their interactions with other firms 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  Second, in an SSO, firms whose technological base is most tied to 
the existing dominant design are likely to be heavy participators in SSO subcommittees and 
working groups, and hence more likely to develop extensive relationships with other firms. As a 
result, a firm’s centrality is also likely to be associated with congruence between a firm’s 
technological base and the dominant design, giving it a stake in the existing socio-technical 
order.  Firms whose technologies are incongruent with the technology being advanced by an 
SSO are less likely to be central within the SSO.   
A social network position that bridges structural holes, i.e. a position that connects 
otherwise disconnected actors or groups of actors, also causes a firm to develop a stake in the 
existing socio-technical order through positive effects on its information flows and social 
influence (Burt, 1992).  In an SSO, a firm that participates in multiple businesses might be in a 
bridging position.  For example, Motorola manufactures both wireless telephone handsets and 
wireless infrastructure towers, so if they attend SSO working group meetings for both handsets 
and infrastructure and other handset or infrastructure manufacturers do not, then Motorola would 
bridge a structural hole between handset manufacturers and infrastructure manufacturers in a 
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wireless telecommunications SSO. Bridging structural holes gives actors information and control 
benefits.  Information benefits are primarily about having access to non-redundant information 
held by disparate subgroups, which increases the amount and diversity of information held by the 
bridging actor. Control benefits stem from the ability to shape the access and timing of 
information flows for others, determining which groups get information, and when they get it 
(Burt, 1992).  These information and control benefits can enable a bridging actor to influence 
others, or play one group off against another, reaping returns from brokerage.  Therefore, like 
centrality, a bridging position is generally advantageous, giving a firm in such a position a 
unique stake in the stability of the socio-technical order.   
 
Proposition 5:  Firms that are central in the network of relationships will develop a unique stake 
in the existing socio-technical order, increasing the likelihood that they will act to reinforce the 
existing order.  
 
Proposition 6:  Firms that bridge structural holes in the network of relationships will develop a 
unique stake in the existing socio-technical order, increasing the likelihood that they will act to 
reinforce the existing order. 
 
On the other hand, firms that bridge structural holes may also be more likely to raise 
challenges to a socio-technical order if they use their information advantages to innovate in a 
way that is inconsistent with the dominant design.  Bridging relationships with actors from 
different and disconnected parts of the social environment can put firms in a better position to 
innovate by providing non-redundant information that can be recombined into new alternatives 
that might stretch the limits of the dominant design.  These innovations may provide 
opportunities to advantage a firm that makes them.  For example, though SSO members are 
typically required to license intellectual property contained in a standard under fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms6 (Simcoe, 2007), licensing these rights can result in substantial 
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revenues for the innovator.  More generally, innovations can shift a firm’s technological base, 
adding to a firm’s portfolio of technologies, or creating a new technological direction or 
competence that gives strategic advantage to the firm.  Note that though central firms also have 
extensive access to information, the information available to very highly-connected firms tends 
to have redundancies that reinforce consistency with the existing dominant design, limiting 
tendencies to innovate in radical ways.  By contrast, the diverse information available to a firm 
that bridges structural holes is more prone to be recombined in ways that result in fundamental 
changes to its technological base. A change in a firm’s technological base can create a stake in 
challenging an existing socio-technical order.  
 
Proposition 7:  Firms that bridge structural holes in the network of relationships will develop a 
unique stake in the changing the socio-technical order if they innovate such that their core 
technologies become inconsistent with an existing socio-technical order, increasing the 
likelihood that they will act to challenge the existing order. 
 
Individual Actors and the Negotiation of Social Order in the SSO Context 
Analogous to the social network of relationships between firms discussed above, the 
network of relationships between individual actors is an important contextual condition of SSOs. 
Even when individuals represent firms, they develop their own personal social capital and 
personal friendships within standards setting committees (Isaak, 2006).  The network of 
interpersonal relationships within SSOs is distinct from the network between firms, and has 
independent influences on actions to reinforce or challenge a socio-technical order.  Firms can 
send multiple people to represent them to different subcommittees or working groups of an SSO, 
and individual representatives of the same firm can have different levels of participation and 
interact with different people, such that they occupy non-equivalent positions in the social 
network connecting individuals in a technological community (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010).   
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Individuals’ actions are influenced by their position in the interpersonal network.  
Individuals who occupy privileged positions in interpersonal networks in an SSO would more 
likely develop their own unique stakes in reinforcing the existing order.  For individuals, as for 
firms, centrality enhances the ability to acquire knowledge and mobilize resources. Central 
individuals in SSO could be those in leadership positions, e.g. subcommittee chairs, or positions 
that require interaction with many others, e.g. editors of standards, or simply have a propensity 
or preference to interact with many others.  In addition, individual relationships can also have 
affective content that influences the propensity to reinforce or challenge. Close relationships 
exert social influence in shaping attitudes and beliefs (Denrell & Le Mens, 2007), suggesting that 
the people with a friendship tie to a central actor might come to share conceptions of which 
technologies are superior, leading them to develop a common stake in the existing order with 
central individuals.  This similarity in attitudes and beliefs would make individuals connected 
with central individuals more likely to reinforce the socio-technical order.   
Individuals who bridge structural holes also have a number of advantages that lead them 
to develop a unique stake in the existing socio-technical order.  Analogous to firms, their 
position bridging otherwise disconnected people or groups of people gives them information and 
control benefits, such that they have access to more and more diverse information, and they can 
control the information that others get (Burt, 1992).  In an SSO context, individuals who bridge 
structural holes might be those that sit on multiple subcommittees with otherwise non-
overlapping membership. Most of the theory and research concerning structural holes at the 
individual level of analysis is about competitive advantage, i.e. how actors can use their superior 
access to information about opportunities and preferences of other actors to their advantage in 
negotiation (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Bridging individuals are more likely to be promoted and 
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paid more, and they may have more control over the image they present and their personal 
reputations (Burt, 1997; Podolny & Baron, 1997).  Bridging individuals in SSOs can also have 
better access to personal advancement opportunities, such as working on high-visibility projects, 
or hearing about job openings at other firms that participate in the SSO (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 
2010).  Therefore bridging individuals who use their position for competitive advantage should 
develop a stake in the status quo, and be more likely to act to reinforce the socio-technical order.  
 
Proposition 8:  Individuals who are central in the network of relationships will develop a unique 
stake in the existing socio-technical order, and common stakes with those they are directly 
connected to, increasing the likelihood that central individuals and their direct connections will 
act to reinforce the existing order. 
 
Proposition 9:  Individuals who bridge structural holes in the network of relationships who are 
motivated by personal competitive advantage will develop a unique stake in the existing socio-
technical order, increasing the likelihood that they will act to reinforce the existing order. 
 
Structural hole theory also emphasizes autonomy for a bridging position.  Because 
bridging actors are less embedded in a single social group, they are able to act more freely and 
more flexibly.  Research examining the link between a network position that bridges structural 
holes and competitive advantage focuses attention on individuals’ stakes in their personal 
advantage. Some individuals, however, show a propensity to coordinate, and use their bridging 
position to bring other actors together or translate across different perspectives to enable 
innovation (Obstfeld, 2005). Rather than personal advantage, these individuals may have an 
interest in promoting collaborative decision-making processes, or innovation leading to superior 
technologies. Therefore, actors who bridge structural holes can use their control benefits to sort 
through and speed the flow of information and increase coordination, rather than blocking the 
flow of information (Burt, 1997). This coordination activity for non-redundant information adds 
value to organizations, and can contribute to an organization’s ability to innovate successfully 
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(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).  This type of coordination propensity can 
lead individuals in a bridging position to develop a stake in challenging the existing order if 
resulting innovation creates an option for a superior and more consensus-driven technological 
direction than the one currently pursued.  
 
Proposition 10:  Individuals who bridge structural holes in the network of relationships who are 
motivated by a propensity to coordinate may develop a unique stake in the changing existing 
socio-technical order, increasing the likelihood that they will act to challenge the existing order.  
 
 
Next, professional norms in the engineering profession are an important contextual 
condition that define actions and outcomes that are legitimate, or normatively acceptable. While 
individual engineers within SSOs are agents for their employing firms, they are also agents or 
representatives of their profession. As a result, professional norms will likely guide interactions 
between individuals that lead them to challenge or reinforce the existing socio-technical order.  
Engineers have a professional culture that is distinguished by a strong commitment to 
technology, desire to work on technology that is “cool,” open exchange of technical knowledge, 
and respect for technical skill (Kunda, 1995; Perlow & Bailyn, 1997).  One implication of this 
distinctive engineering culture is that professional norms and values support a commitment to the 
technology itself, and to supporting standards or changes to standards that are perceived as 
technologically innovative, elegant, or superior.  This professional commitment to the 
technology has the potential to reinforce a dominant design by limiting overtly political 
challenges to the existing socio-technical order.   
 
Proposition 11: Professional norms define politically motivated challenges to the socio-technical 
order as illegitimate, increasing reinforcement actions if proposed alternatives are 
technologically inferior 
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These same professional norms and legitimacy concerns, however, can also promote 
actions that challenge a socio-technical order by protecting and supporting new and superior 
technologies in the wake of political opposition on the part of powerful firms with a vested 
interest in preserving existing technologies.  The story of Qualcomm and CDMA standards, 
discussed above, can also serve as an example here.  While the SSO’s formal rules and 
procedures were important in making it possible for Qualcomm to propose its standard, 
professional norms were important in enabling those rules to gain support. Professional norms 
can make it legitimate for individuals to support superior technologies even if an inferior 
technology may better serve their employers’ interests. The Chair of the TIA subcommittee who 
presided over the approval of the first CDMA standard told that story to illustrate when 
engineers supported a technologically superior option despite political pressure to vote against it, 
saying “it’s hard to turn the integrity switch ‘off’.”7 
 
Proposition 12: Professional norms define politically motivated opposition to new technologies 
as illegitimate, increasing challenge actions if proposed alternatives are technologically superior. 
 
Discussion 
Implications for the technology cycles model 
In this paper, we extend prior research about technology cycles by going beyond the 
establishment of a dominant design to identify social processes at play during eras of incremental 
change. Our premise in this analysis was that limiting attention to the selection of a dominant 
design tells only part of the technological evolution story, and that the technology cycles model 
needs to be extended to account for active social interaction in periods of incremental 
technological change. We draw on the negotiated order perspective to overturn technology 
cycles theory’s ontological assumption that social order is stable, assuming instead that social 
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order is constantly being reinforced and challenged through social interaction.  Reinforcement of 
the socio-technical order reflects the social work necessary to maintain the existing order, and 
challenges to the socio-technical order present opportunities for the existing order to be 
overturned when challenges are unaddressed or when they present technological alternatives that 
become widely accepted.   
Therefore, taking an assumption of instability yields two extensions to the technology 
cycles model: an era of incremental change that is socially active, and an endogenous mechanism 
for discontinuous change.   
 
******************Figure 3 about here****************** 
 
First, instead of being characterized by technological momentum and elaboration of a 
dominant design, Figure 3 shows that eras of incremental change involve ongoing negotiation 
between actors, and actions that either reinforce the dominant design or challenge it. Extending 
the model in this way is consistent with empirical observations that incremental technological 
change is shaped by continual social interaction (e.g. Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010; Jakobs et al. 
2001; Leiponen 2008; Simcoe 2007; Spring et al. 1995). For example, Isaak (2006) describes the 
co-evolution over fifteen years of technical standards and social capital in an SSO for the POSIX 
software platform. He finds that repeated interactions resulted in trusting relationships and the 
reinforcement of common stakes among individuals.  Other work shows that social interaction 
and relationships in SSOs are important in determining whether or not a firm supports a standard, 
above and beyond technology considerations (Ranganathan, 2011). These empirical observations 
cannot be explained by current technology cycles theory, which emphasizes inertia and stable 
technological trajectories driven by the dominant design (Dosi, 1982; Jenkins & Floyd, 2001).   
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Extending the model can also spur additional research into the industrial dynamics of 
technological evolution by encouraging technology management scholars to broaden their focus 
to the social interactions that happen at all stages of the technology cycle.  We provide a 
framework for studying these social interactions, along with propositions that can be tested in 
quantitative empirical study.  Studies that apply micro-sociological approaches to issues of 
technology cycles or technological change typically take a case study approach that enables rich 
understanding of the micro-processes of technological change (e.g. Garud & Rappa, 1994; 
Maguire, 2004).  Our framework is based on a micro-sociological negotiated order approach, but 
we supplement negotiated order ideas of interactions and contextual conditions with more recent 
social network (Burt 1992; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993) and professions (Abbott, 1991) 
concepts to develop middle-range, testable theory for conceptualizing the processes of 
technological evolution (Merton 1968: 39).  
A second important implication of the extended technology cycles model is that changes 
that are conceptualized as strictly exogenous could, in fact, be rooted within a technological 
community.  As highlighted in Figure 3, innovations that appear suddenly and overturn the 
existing socio-technical order can be the outcome of endogenous social interactions in the era of 
incremental change, as well as coming from exogenous sources. In some cases, discontinuous 
change can stem from failed challenges by a community member.  Firms or individuals who 
dislike the direction of incremental change can break from the community and start a new 
community.  In other cases, an innovation is not only originated within the existing community, 
but supported by it, leaving the existing community intact.  For example, mobile phone 
technology was a natural outgrowth of personal radio communication and telephone technology, 
and leaders in those industries, like Motorola, Nokia, Ericsson, and AT&T and its offshoots 
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remained leaders as cellular systems became standard for mobile telephony, and analog systems 
were replaced by digital systems (Farley, 2005). In flight simulation technology, the dominant 
design of full flight simulation was challenged by flight training device technology, which was 
eventually incorporated into a new hybrid dominant design within the same SSO (Rosenkopf & 
Tushman, 1998). Even incumbents that are displaced in the market by startups with a disruptive 
technology can be unsurprised by the technology itself.  Leading disk drive manufacturers that 
failed in the market for the next generation of disk drive technology, were not only aware of the 
technology, but had in some cases, already successfully developed it (Christensen & Bower, 
1996).  These examples illustrate both a need for an extended model and directions of study for 
technology management scholars.   
The characterization of endogenous change as exogenous shocks could, in part, be due to 
the technology management literature’s limited attention to the SSO as a venue for innovation. 
Most technology management research about SSOs emphasizes their potential for slowing down 
the innovation process or making it politically driven (e.g. Jakobs, 2002; Shapiro & Varian, 
1999; Simcoe, 2007; Spring, et al., 1995), rather than viewing SSOs as a venue for social 
interaction that could potentially lead to innovation.  Our analysis provides theoretical 
justification for examination of SSOs as a generator of new technologies and more radical 
evolution to the dominant design. 
Finally, an additional implication of our research stems from negotiated order theory’s 
emphasis on the types of actors and agency relationships between them as an important 
contextual condition. Existing research on dominant design and the industrial dynamics of 
technological change has rarely considered multiple levels of analysis.  A negotiated order 
perspective, with its emphasis individuals as representatives of other social actors, encourages 
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serious consideration for the role of actors at multiple levels of analysis in technological change.  
Most of the technology management literature on technological evolution focuses on firm actors 
(e.g. Garud et al. 2002; Henderson and Clark 1990; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2002; Tushman and 
Anderson 1986); however, technologies evolve through the actions and interactions of many 
kinds of actors in a technological community. Rather than a stylized picture of firms interacting, 
an image of concrete, observable negotiations in a grounded context like an SSO requires 
consideration of individual representatives’ capabilities and motivations, their relationships, and 
institutional influences from professions.   
 
Implications for other theories of technological change 
In addition to the extensions to the technology cycles model highlighted above, our study 
has implications for broader conceptions of technological change and technological 
communities. For extending the technology cycles model, we limited our focus to technological 
communities that produce complex technologies and use formal, collaborative standards setting 
practices in SSOs.  Technologies that are complex systems, with high interdependency between 
components have a far greater need for coordination than simple technologies (Murmann and 
Frenken 2006; Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992), and are more likely to have an active community 
of firms and individuals involved with the ongoing evolution and production of the technology.  
Limiting our focus in this way allows us to develop specific and contextualized predictions that 
explore the social dynamics of technology standardization.  However, we recognize that theory 
about the interactions between technology and society range broadly (Leonardi & Barley, 2010). 
While the technology cycles model examines technological communities that develop and 
produce technology, other theoretical perspectives account for user problem definitions and the 
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construction of meaning during use (Bijker and Pinch 1984; Orlikowski and Scott 2008), or the 
effects of technology implementation on structure, power and relationships in using 
organizations (Barley 1986).  Cross-fertilization of technology cycles theory with these other 
theories has been has been extremely limited to date, yet integrating these perspectives can 
enrich understanding of technological evolution by incorporating the role of users and user 
communities with the technological community (Munir & Jones, 2004).  For example, recent 
work on user-driven innovation and entrepreneurship (Tripsas & Shah, 2007) suggests that users 
can be a source of both discontinuous change and additions to the technological community. 
However, our work in extending the technology cycles model can also enrich constructivist 
perspectives by offering a framework that is explicitly based on social interaction of both 
individuals and firms, and a regular venue of SSOs for exploring questions about how producers 
construct meaning and value around technologies.  
  
Implications for other social theory 
In addition to its contributions to technology cycles theory, our work has implications for 
theory about institutional change. Change in the dominant design, i.e. the socio-technical order, 
can be considered a specific type of institutional change. In assuming instability, we emphasize 
the need to explain institutional persistence or stability, a topic that has received limited attention 
in prior research (Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Reay & Hinings, 
2009). We extend existing research to identify contextual conditions, such as the network of 
relationships between actors, that have not been explored as sources of institutional maintenance 
in prior research (e.g. Scott, 2000). Second, in showing that negotiations leading to maintenance 
actions can be informed by multiple institutional logics, our research challenges the assumption 
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that a multiplicity of institutional logics is by definition a source of instability. Consistent with 
the idea that institutional logics can operate at multiple levels of analysis (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008), action in the context of SSOs may be shaped by societal-level institutional logics of 
market competition and the engineering profession, and of the organization-level institutional 
logics of the SSO. Rather than assuming that conflict between logics must be managed, or 
resolved through selection of one over others (Dokko & Gaba, forthcoming; Nigam & Ocasio, 
2010), our research suggests that the multiplicity of institutional logics is simply a feature of the 
broader social context that influences social interactions. Multiple logics can complement one 
another to inform maintenance actions or compete to result in challenge actions.  
Finally, our research emphasizes that interactions between actors, rather than conflict 
between logics, is the locus for change. This highlights the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of social interaction in research on institutional theory. In contrast to prior 
research that focuses on individual agency or competition between actors (e.g. Jones, Maoret, & 
Massa, forthcoming; Seo & Creed, 2002), our work suggests that actors can have multi-faceted 
relationships with each other. Our focus on the contextual conditions of negotiations, 
furthermore, emphasizes that the nature of social interaction between parties is influenced not 
only by institutional factors, but also by the proximate contextual conditions of their interactions.  
In addition to implications for institutional theory, our focus on when and how social 
interaction can reinforce a social order also has implications for process theories of organization. 
A recent stream of organization theory research develops the idea that organizations, 
organizational routines, and social structures are instantiations of process (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). Performances of routines make them a source of evolution and 
change, and organizations constantly change and evolve as a consequence of the interactions, 
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adaptations, and negotiations of their participants. Our research, grounded in negotiated order 
theory, shares with this research the basic ontological assumption that the social order is not 
stable. However, focusing attention on the theoretical challenge of stability in the social order 
highlights the need to distinguish periods of relative stability, i.e. incremental change, from 
periods of more radical or disruptive change. Punctuated equilibrium models of change like 
technology cycles theory have resonance, in part, because we often perceive stability and 
predictability in the social order, and perceive that this predictability is occasionally upended in 
specific social arenas, resulting in confusion, intensified sensemaking, and more radical change. 
Our research identifies conditions that shape actions leading to accelerated or disruptive change 
on one hand, and more incremental change on the other hand. Though process theory research 
has started to consider less constant patterns of change (Zbaracki & Bergen, 2010), exploring 
how incremental change, rooted in constant process and social interaction, can give way to more 
disruptive, radical change should be a fruitful direction for future research. 
 
Implications for practice 
Our theoretical emphasis on eras of incremental change also has implications for practitioners 
concerned with technology standards and technological change.  Though scholars have paid most 
attention to the establishment of a dominant design, a negotiated order perspective better reflects 
empirical accounts of SSO activity in eras of incremental change (Isaak, 2006; Jakobs, et al., 
2001; Spring, et al., 1995). It also makes predictions that can guide participants’ activity. For 
example, firms or individuals who seek to challenge the status quo can understand that resistance 
will be more likely if there are densely interconnected relationships between SSO members, or 
the existing dominant design is congruent with the norms of relevant professions.  Another 
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important practical implication of our analysis concerns the separation of firm and individual 
actors.   Firms should be aware that their representatives may be subject to legitimacy concerns 
and relationship concerns that affect their propensity act in ways their employers 
want.  Moreover, previous research finds that individuals carry their relationships with them 
when they change employers within an SSO (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010), suggesting that firms 
need to be sensitive to how job mobility can change the overall network structure of relationships 
and the subsequent propensity for action.  Finally, our propositions encourage SSO participants 
to consider how contextual conditions of the SSO context affect their and others’ propensity and 
ability to act in reinforcing or challenging an existing socio-technical order.  Though interests, 
i.e. stakes and goals, and agency relationships are generally understood to drive behavior, other 
contextual conditions of SSOs, e.g. the governance structure, the structure of relationships, and 
legitimacy concerns, may be less obvious to practitioners as factors to consider when guiding 
their own behavior or predicting the behavior of others. 
 
Notes 
We thank Rodney Lacey, our editor Andreas Rasche, and participants in the 2009 EGOS track 
on the dynamics of standardization for their valuable comments. 
                                                 
1
 Other perspectives on technological change, e.g. social construction of technology and 
technology structuration, have explored the intersection of social systems and technological 
change by considering the dialectic between user problems and technological alternatives (Bijker 
& Pinch, 1984), or the construction of meaning around technology as it is implemented and used 
within organizations  (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 1992).  Our interest is in the technological 
community of firms and individuals who develop technology and how their social interaction 
affects technological change over the technology’s life. 
2
 See http://www.dvdforum.org/forum.shtml 
3
 Notable exceptions exist, e.g. the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) whose members are 
individuals with interest in coordinating and developing technical standards for the internet.   
4
 It is important to note that though technologies generally advance through SSO discussions, the 
eventual agreements might not be optimal. Because the processes around standardization are 
social as well as technical, political behavior and compromise may prevent the most 
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technologically superior option from becoming the adopted standard (e.g. MacKenzie, 1987; 
Yoxen, 1987). 
5
 www.ansi.org 
6
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that there are notable exceptions to this 
practice, e.g. the IETF and the W3C Consortium. 
7
 Private communication to one of the authors. 
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Figure 1:  Technology Cycles Model 
 
 
 
Technological Discontinuity
(Variation)
Era of Incremental Change
(Retention)
• Elaboration of dominant design
• Technological momentum
Era of Ferment
Dominant Design
(Selection)
Adapted from: M.J. Tushman and L. Rosenkopf, “Organizational Determinants of Technological Change: Toward a Sociology 
of Technological Evolution,” in Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 14, Greenwich,CT: Jai Press, 1992, pp. 311-347.
Exogenous 
shock
45 
 
Figure 2:  Contextual Conditions, Mechanisms and Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Figure 3:  Technology Cycles Model, Revised 
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